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The assumption is that neither trusts the other; they rat one another out; they are both worse off than if they had kept their mouths shut.One approach to Prisoner's Dilemma that did the best was Anatol Rapoport's entry, "TIT FOR TAT." Here, one keeps one's mouth shut, for example, as long as one's confederate does not rat him/her out. Robert Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation" is a classic in our understanding of why cooperation occurs in humans. This is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5, which outlines how cooperation could evolve as an adaptive behavior within a species.One key part of this book is a round robin tournament in which a variety of strategies are tested in an "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma" game. It begins to raise approaches to understanding "altruism," self-sacrifice that benefits others (and would also benefit the altruist in the long run).At any rate, this is a thought provoking book and a genuine classic, with many applications in public life and in our own daily lives.
In short, cooperate as long as the other player cooperates; be nasty when the other player is nasty; don't hold grudges and keep punishing if the other person begins cooperating.Of course, things are actually more complex than this, but the above gives a sense of the nature of the winning strategy. It does raise questions about the common assumption that everyone is selfish and will always do what is needed to advance one's interests at the expense of others. But it is the one that worked best. This was the simplest of the entries, according to Axelrod.
The premise is simple: two thieves have been caught by the police. If the other player quits ratting out, then one ceases ratting the other out. The book begins with a simple question (Page vii): "When should a person cooperate, and when should that person be selfish, in an ongoing interaction with another person." The ultimate explanation for the choice, according to Axelrod (and evolutionary theorist William Hamilton) is evolution. If the other person rats one out, you turn the tables and rat him/her out.
If both rat one another out, they both get a tougher sentence (although not as bad as if one person keeps quiet and the other one squeals). Prisoner's Dilemma is a game among the variety of those used in what is called Game Theory. The policy offer a deal: Rat out your partner, s/he gets a tough sentence and the turncoat gets off.
International relations theory is essentially, an analysis of different states to determine how each may cooperate with another and the relationships that develop when states decide to cooperate with one another. For example, Axelrod inquires how the live and let live system emerged, how it was/ is sustained, when might it end, and what are the limitations of its use. He suggests that cooperation can be as simple as acting offensively but in a predictive manner, and that cooperation between opposing forces does not imply that either side must surrender physically, morally, or in principle (to any demands) by the other side. By varying the focus of his analysis, he is able to study elements of cooperation between both protagonists and antagonists.
In his book, "The Evolution of Cooperation," Robert Axelrod states that cooperation can be achieved by all parties and he further explains how cooperation may emerge between enemies in unfavorable conditions. Whether referred to as diplomacy, reciprocity, crisis management, live and let live technique, or otherwise, cooperation and cooperative resolution equals success. Axelrod states that cooperation may emerge in situations which, at first glance, probably would not naturally elicit cooperation. Axelrod uses historical examples to demonstrate his thesis as well as supports his examples with variables such as cooperation theory, game theory, and reciprocity discussed throughout the book.
Axelrod's proposition is empirical in its purposes and is meant to explain how cooperation may emerge. The international system level of analysis is featured significantly throughout his book, and he employs its basic characteristic of posing general questions to effectively describe patterns of outcomes, although not determine specific outcomes. He then examines how each concept and theory can be further elaborated.
If the test for different life forms are organisms which have their own DNA, mitochondria qualify. Interestingly, the places where reciprocal ultruism has tragically broken down are places that would easily be predicted by the over arching theory.For students of genetics, biology and even behavior I can't recommend this book highly enough. If the competitor cooperated, Tit for Tat would thereafter cooperate.
And like with Newton's Principia and Darwin's Origin of Species I was not disappointed but found many instances in which the original researchers had advanced speculations that frankly would remain fertile areas for further research. In fact, in addition to this book I would also recommed the following:Origins of Virtue by Matt Ridley which discusses the genetic aspects of reciprocal ultruism;Prisoner's Dilemma by William Poundstone which discusses game theory as a branch of theoretical mathematics;Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins which is just fun; andOneness by Jeffrey Moses which provides verbatim quotes of the golden rule and other doxology by means of direct quotes from the world's leading religions. In the case of this book, I would include Axelrod's discussion of how to better take advantage of the benefits of reciprocal ultruism and also how systems can be more reciprocal ultruism friendly.
It's perhaps one of the most fasicinating quirks of psychological research that one of the most ground breaking findings in human psychology was achieved by means of a computer tournament.That tournament was sponsored by Robert Axelrod of the University of Michigan who developed a computer environment that would different game programs against each other to determine which survival strategy was best adapted to survival.For those believers of life, nasty, brutish and short, the findings were nothing short of astonishing: specifically that when actors were invovled in situations where they would be repeatedly interacting with each other, survival was best enhanced by cooperation.Otherwise known as "the golden rule" of doing unto others as you would have done unto you, a computer program known as Tit for Tat outperformed all other competitors by first seeking cooperation and then narrowly mirroring the actions of its counterparts.In other words, if Tit for Tat met a competitor it would first seek cooperation. And they have been there own life domain for the better part of two billion (or more) years.Mitochondria's ability to productively work with their host cells is an example of both genetic and biological reciprocal ultruism.Like any ground breaking work, like Newton's Principia or Darwin's Origin of Species, I was attracted to this work so I could better witness the original flash of genius. There's nothing like seeing material which so exactly corresponds to theoretical predictions to give you a sense of the explanatory power of the theory(ies) involved.
If the competitor defected, Tit for Tat would itself immediately defect but thereafter again seek cooperation by cooperating whenever the competitor thereafter chose to cooperate.Since the publication of the original article detailing Axelrod's findings twenty five years ago, the study of cooperation or reciprocal ultruism has found applications not only in human behavior but also in genetics and evolution itself.Inside every cell of your body are anywhere ranging to around 1000 mitochondria. Yet, they have always been a part of human biology.
It's a waste of your life to not read it. The ideas presented in this book have so many far reaching applications.
This may not seem terribly compelling. Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble.
Its forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation. Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried.
Overall, the book is interesting and provides nuanced insight into what could easily be dismissed as something too simple to be true or useful.The author's basic assertion - that "tit-for-tat" is the best strategy to produce long-term cooperation - seems hardly worthy of an entire book. 54:"What accounts for TIT FOR TAT's robust success is its combination of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear.
And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation Also, the primary evidence in support of this assertion is a few simplistic computer simulations from the early 1980s.
However, each chapter supports the assertion in a different way and cuts to the heart of why "tit-for-tat" is, indeed, a good strategy in life as well as in game theory.The best summary, perhaps, can be found on p.
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